

BONN ECON NEWS

June 24–28, 2024

Overview

People

New at the department

Workshops and seminars

Monday, June 24, 2024

Micro Theory Seminar

Bumin Yenmez (Washington University in St. Louis)

“Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy”

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

BGSE Applied Microeconomics Workshop

Amelie Schiprowski (University of Bonn)

“Committee Deliberation and Gender Differences in Influence”

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

MEF/ECONtribute Seminar (Macro/Econometrics/Finance)

Dirk Krüger (University of Pennsylvania)

“Shaping Inequality and Intergenerational Persistence of Poverty: Free College or Better Schools”

Micro Theory Seminar

Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

“Mediated Renegotiation”

Friday, June 28, 2024

Applied Micro Coffee

Luca Henkel (University of Chicago)

“The Role of Interpersonal Uncertainty in Prosocial Behavior”

Bonn Macro Internal Seminar

Timothy Meyer (University of Bonn)

“The Great Leveler According to HANK”

People

New at the department

Mr Zheng Gong

Position: Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute for Macroeconomics and Econometrics

Research Interests: Heterogeneous-agent Macroeconomics, Financial Economics, Industrial Organization

Workshops and seminars

Monday, June 24, 2024

Micro Theory Seminar

Bumin Yenmez
(Washington University in St. Louis)

"Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy"

Coauthors

Isa Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, Koji Yokote

Time

16:30–17:45 CET

Location

Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)

Abstract

We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has dual goals of diversity and meritocracy when choosing from a set of applications. For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a class of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a diversity level. Using this class, we find all subsets of applications on the diversity-merit Pareto frontier. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

BGSE Applied Microeconomics Workshop

Amelie Schiprowski
(University of Bonn)

"Committee Deliberation and Gender Differences in Influence"

Coauthor

Jonas Radbruch

Time

13:00–14:00 CET

Location

IZA, Conference Room
Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence on the aggregation of information in committees. We use data on the decision-making process of hiring committees within a large private company, where committee members first conduct independent one-to-one interviews and then deliberate on a collective hiring decision. We find that committee decisions are systematically less aligned with the initial recommendations of women than with those of men, despite equal levels of qualification and experience. This gender difference in influence is strongest when disagreement is large and when women are in the minority. We document implications for the gender composition of new hires.

MEF/ECONtribute Seminar (Macro/Econometrics/Finance)

<p>Dirk Krüger (University of Pennsylvania)</p>	<p>"Shaping Inequality and Intergenerational Persistence of Poverty: Free College or Better Schools"</p>
<p>Coauthors Alexander Ludwig, Irina Popova</p> <p>Time 12:15–13:30 CET</p> <p>Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)</p>	<p>Abstract</p> <p>We evaluate the aggregate, distributional and welfare consequences of alternative government education policies to encourage college completion, such as making college free and improving funding for public schooling. To do so, we construct a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with intergenerational linkages, a higher education choice as well as a multi-stage human capital production process during childhood and adolescence with parental and government schooling investments. The model features rich cross-sectional heterogeneity, distinguishes between single and married parents, and is disciplined by US household survey data on income, wealth, education and time use. Studying the transitions induced by unexpected policy reforms we show that the "free college" and the "better schools" reform generate significant welfare gains, which take time to materialize and are lower in general than in partial equilibrium. It is optimal to combine both reforms: tuition subsidies make college affordable even for children from poorer parental backgrounds and better schools increase human capital thereby reducing dropout risk.</p>

Micro Theory Seminar

<p>Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)</p>	<p>"Mediated Renegotiation"</p>
<p>Coauthors Andrea Attar, Lorenzo Bozzoli</p> <p>Time 16:30–17:45 CET</p> <p>Location Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)</p>	<p>Abstract</p> <p>We develop a new approach to contract renegotiation under informational frictions. Specifically, we consider mediated mechanisms which cannot be contingent on any subsequent offer, but can generate a new source of asymmetric information between the contracting parties. Taking as a reference the canonical framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), we show that, if mediated mechanisms are allowed, the corresponding renegotiation game admits only one equilibrium allocation, which coincides with the second-best one. Thus, the inefficiencies typically associated to the threat of renegotiation may be completely offset by the design of more sophisticated trading mechanisms.</p>

Applied Micro Coffee

<p>Luca Henkel (University of Chicago)</p>	<p>"The Role of Interpersonal Uncertainty in Prosocial Behavior"</p>
<p>Coauthor Anujit Chakraborty</p> <p>Time 11:30-12:15 CET</p> <p>Location IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9</p> <p>Hybrid https://uni-bonn.zoom-x.de/j/64524248902?pwd=Wk1kZHpUNkVqVjkydnBhUGpWMFJZZz09</p>	<p>Abstract</p> <p>Prosocial decisions contain inherent uncertainty about how one's decisions will impact others' utility—we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people's response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard social allocation decisions, we replicate the classic patterns of ingroup favoritism, merit-based fairness ideals, and self-favoring behavior in dictator games. We then show that these patterns also arise in non-social decisions which have no consequences for others and instead solely reflect responses to interpersonal uncertainty. Behavior across social and non-social decisions is highly correlated, and self-reported interpersonal uncertainty predicts behavior in both situations. Moreover, exogenously varying interpersonal uncertainty shifts prosocial behavior in the direction that avoids such uncertainty. Our results quantify how interpersonal uncertainty influences prosocial behavior, which we estimate to be of similar quantitative importance to social preferences.</p>

Bonn Macro Internal Seminar

<p>Timothy Meyer (University of Bonn)</p>	<p>"The Great Leveler According to HANK"</p>
<p>Time 16:30–17:30 CET</p> <p>Location Kaiserplatz 7–9, Room 4.006</p>	<p>Abstract ---</p>